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2Abstract
Research has shown that: individuals positively distinguish themselves from most other
people; being consistent is positively valued; injunctive and descriptive norms are perceived
to protect victims. Joining these findings, we argue that individuals present themselves as
following injunctive and descriptive norms towards victims to a higher extent and more
consistently than most people. In an experimental study 273 university students of both sexes
indicated what they and most other people would approve of (injunctive norm) or typically do
(descriptive norm) regarding various reactions towards either an innocent or a noninnocent
victim. The reactions involved secondary victimization (devaluation/derogation, avoidance,
suffering minimization, blaming the victim) and non secondary victimization (valuation,
contact, suffering acknowledgment, not blaming the victim). Participants perceived
themselves and most people as approving of more non secondary than secondary
victimization reactions, except for blaming the noninnocent victim. Participants indicated they
approved of most of the normative reactions to a higher extent than most people, which is
interpreted as a new instance of the Primus Inter Pares effect. Participants also indicated they
would show more consistency between their injunctive and descriptive norms, especially
towards the innocent victim. Results suggest that individuals perceive themselves as more
immune to perverse norms than most people.
Keywords: secondary victimization, injunctive norms, descriptive norms, Primus Inter Pares
effect, perverse norms.
3A wide body of research and theorizing has repeatedly found and predicted various
counterintuitive reactions towards innocent victims, especially towards those whose suffering
cannot be relieved (Correia, Vala, & Aguiar, 2001; Correia & Vala, 2003; Hafer, 2000; Hafer
& Bègue, 2005; Lerner, 1980). Specifically, this literature has ascertained that individuals
unconsciously blame and derogate these victims in emotionally-laden situations. These
surprising reactions play an important role in the lives of individuals who witness undeserved
suffering –they protect their “fundamental delusion” that the world is just- (Lerner, 1980).
Without questioning these findings, our approach aims to complement them by focusing on
the normative processes guiding reactions to victims, an issue which the literature has
generally neglected (but see Lerner, 2003; see also van den Bos & Maas, 2009, for an
empirical approach). Specifically, our main goal was to investigate individuals’ perceptions of
what they and most people approve of and how they typically react towards victims presented
as either contributing or not contributing to their deep and permanent suffering. In other
words, we aimed to investigate individuals’ perceptions of personal and social injunctive and
descriptive norms, respectively (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Cialdini & Trost, 1998) of
reactions towards innocent and noninnocent victims whose suffering cannot be relieved.
The relevance of our research was twofold: theoretical and practical. Theoretically it
broadens our understanding of the mechanisms involved in such reactions. In fact, by
focusing on the normative aspects of reactions towards victims, it is possible to ascertain that
individuals may use their discourses on what they and most people approve of and do towards
victims as a device to positively distinguish themselves from other people. Specifically, they
are expected to display the Primus Inter Pares effect (Codol, 1975), that is, to self-present as
more normative than most people. This self-others distinction would be accomplished in two
ways. First, participants could indicate that they approve of and engage in the normative
reactions to a higher extent than most people. Second, participants could present themselves
as more consistent than most people regarding what they approve of and typically do. For
instance, given that consistency is socially approved of (Channouf & Mangard, 1997),
participants were expected to indicate that they, but not most of the people, would typically
contact victims to the same extent as they approve of it. As a result, individuals fall prey of a
kind of a normative delusion which is likely to have practical consequences. Specifically, it
may prevent individuals from acknowledging that they are likely to display the unsupportive
reactions towards victims (secondary victimization, Brickman et al., 1982) as much as other
people do and thus fail to correct these reactions. Although norms seemingly protect victims
(Alves & Correia, 2009), the biased perception that one follows them may be a second layer
4of causes adding to emotional arousal that lead to unsupportive reactions. Hence, at a practical
level, our research was relevant because the knowledge derived from it can be used in
campaigns to make people aware of this normative delusion. In so doing, we could promote
actual justice towards those people who especially need it.
The various reactions towards victims
Lerner (1980; see also Hafer & Bègue, 2005) created what possibly is one of the most
complete taxonomies of reactions towards victims. Lerner, divided these reactions into two
main categories: rational and nonrational. Through individuals’ rational reactions, not only
acknowledge that victims exist, but also engage in behaviors which are likely to objectively
improve the victim situation (e.g., helping behavior). On the contrary, through nonrational
reactions individuals may fail to acknowledge that injustices exist, for instance undeserved
suffering. Among these reactions, Lerner (1980) identified those generally referred to as
secondary victimization (Brickman et al., 1982), that is, unsupportive reactions which reflect
negatively on the victim situation.
This failure to acknowledge injustices can be accomplished in various ways which
may coexist (Correia et al., 2001). First, individuals may engage in denial-withdrawal. In the
case of denial, individuals may minimize the victim suffering (Sonne & Pope, 1991),
sometimes to the extent of denying it (Cohen, 2001). In the case of withdrawal, individuals
may avoid physical and/or psychological contact with those who are suffering undeservedly
(Hafer, 2000). Second, individuals may reinterpret the character of the victim and perceive
him/her as the kind of person who deserves to suffer (victim devaluation/derogation).
Furthermore, individuals may even reinterpret the objective cause(s) of victim suffering
and/or blame/ hold the innocent victim responsible for his/her suffering (for other strategies,
see Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Lerner, 1980).
The literature has collected much empirical evidence that secondary victimization is a
nonconscious, possibly automatic, and common phenomenon in emotionally-laden situations
(Lerner, 2003). These reactions are common when individuals perceive that they cannot do
much to relieve or end the innocent victim suffering (for reviews, see Hafer & Bègue, 2005;
Lerner, 1980; for empirical evidence see Correia & Vala, 2003; Mohiyeddini & Montada,
1998). For instance, Robbenholt (2000) found that the assignment of more
responsibility/blame to victims of more serious outcomes (not only suffering) is a robust
finding. However, according to Lerner (2003) when individuals are able to engage in
controlled, conscious and relatively emotionally-neutral information processing, these
secondary victimization reactions are not only relatively rare but also disapproved of. In other
5words, when individuals are able to engage in more thoughtful processing, secondary
victimization reactions are counternormative, especially when innocent victims are involved.
In these situations non secondary victimization reactions are more likely and approved of (but
see van den Bos & Maas, 2009).
Social norms and the (counter-) normativity of reactions towards victims
Social norms may refer to what is prescribed and approved of in a given collective
(prescriptive/injunctive norms) or to what members of the collective actually do (descriptive
norms) (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Cialdini et al., 1991; see also the akin distinction between
desirable and factual norms, Codol, 1975). Research has used the concept of social norms in
such diverse domains as pro-environmental behaviors (Félloneau & Becker, 2008; Göckeritz
et al., 2010), conformity (Jacobson & Mortensen, 2011), judgments of (non) deviant in-group
or out-group members (Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 2010), the social value of certain
discourses, such as internality, self-sufficiency and individual anchoring (e.g., Dubois &
Beauvois, 2005) or the belief in a just world (e.g., Alves & Correia, 2008, 2010). Research
has found that social norms can powerfully influence people’s behaviors (Shultz, Nolan,
Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007), even though individuals may fail to notice such
influence (Nolan, Shultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008). To our knowledge,
however, only Alves and Correia (2009) have directly applied social norms, specifically the
conceptual distinction between injunctive and descriptive social norms, to the study of various
secondary victimization and non secondary victimization reactions towards innocent and
noninnocent victims (but see Simons & Piliavin, 1972; Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, & Mentzer,
1980, for indirect evidence on derogation and avoidance, respectively).
In their study, Alves and Correia (2009) first measured participants’ general belief in a
just world (Dalbert, Montada, & Schmitt, 1987), that is, the degree to which they thought that
people get what they deserve (Lerner, 1980). Then participants read about a situation in which
a male or female innocent (someone crashed into his/her car) or noninnocent victim (he/she
crashed into someone’s car) suffered severely and permanently (e.g., being disfigured and in
pain for life). Participants were then asked about four secondary victimization reactions
(devaluation, avoidance, suffering minimization and blame) and their opposites or non
secondary victimization reactions (valuation, contact, suffering acknowledgment and not
blaming). Specifically, they were asked to indicate what they thought most people would
approve of (perception of injunctive normativity) or would do (perception of descriptive
normativity).
6Results indicated that most people are perceived to approve of and to engage in
valuation, contact and suffering acknowledgment, but not in devaluation, avoidance and
suffering minimization towards both the innocent and the noninnocent victim. Victim
innocence and the type of norm (but not participants’ reported general belief in a just world
nor the sex of the victim), however, moderated this general pattern. Regarding the effect of
victim innocence, participants indicated that most people considered valuation and suffering
acknowledgement towards the innocent victim as more normative than towards the
noninnocent victim. The effect of victim innocence was even stronger on blame ratings.
Specifically, results indicated that most people would approve of blaming the noninnocent
victim and not blaming the innocent victim. As far as the type of norm is concerned,
participants indicated that valuation and contact were more injunctively than descriptively
normative. In other words, according to participants, to most people -words are stronger than
actions– the extent to which they are perceived to approve of valuation and contact is higher
than the extent to which they are perceived to typically value and contact victims.
Alves and Correia’s (2009) study, however, had two major limitations which we
address here. First, participants read that the victim had bumped his/her car into another.
Although they also read that the other driver had suffered only minor injury and that he/she
had already fully recovered, this operationalization of the noninnocent victim left room for
participants to perceive him/her not only as a victim but also as a harm-doer. This fact may
have been the cause that led participants indicate that most people would approve of blaming
him/her or to indicate that most people would approve of contacting and valuating him/her
less (as a sort of punishment) than the innocent victim. Thus, in the current study there is no
third-party involved. Second, Alves and Correia only asked about the participants’ perception
regarding most people’s norms. As a consequence, we do not yet know the extent to which
these reactions are also perceived, or at least performed as personally normative. Thus, in this
study we also asked participants to indicate the extent to which they approved of and thought
these reactions would be typical of them.
By asking participants about their personal stand it is possible to compare how they
present their and most people’s norms for reactions towards victims. We expected that
participants took the opportunity to engage in normative self-other distinction and in so doing
they will show the Primus Inter Pares effect (Codol, 1975; see also Hornsey & Jetten, 2004).
According to the Primus Inter Pares effect, individuals tend to see themselves as more
normative than most people on relevant comparative dimensions. The qualification “most
other people” is important to note. In fact, although “primus inter pares” literally means “first
7among equals”, Codol (1975) cautioned that this tendency does not necessarily imply
presenting oneself as being the first of all others (i.e., the most normative). Furthermore,
judging oneself as more normative than most others does not imply that the latter are judged
as counternormative individuals; only that they are (slightly) less normative than the self.
In our study, participants’ ratings reflected the Primus Inter Pares effect in two ways.
First, they indicated that they approve of and typically put into practice the normative
reactions (e.g., valuation) to a higher extent than most people. Second, participants positively
distinguished themselves from most people by presenting themselves as more consistent,
which was positively valued. In fact, even though it was common for individuals to be
inconsistent (Critcher, Huber, Ho, & Koleva, 2009), displaying consistency was prescriptively
normative at least in Western societies (Channouf & Mangard, 1997). Thus, participants
indicated that their typical reactions towards victims (i.e., their indicated descriptive
normativity) reflect to a higher extent than most people the reactions that they approve of (i.e.,
their indicated injunctive normativity). In other words, there was higher consistency between
the participants’ stated norms than between those attributed to most people.
Goals and hypotheses
This study was centered on individuals’ perceptions of their and most people’s
approved of (perception of injunctive normativity) and typical reactions (perception of
descriptive normativity) towards innocent and noninnocent victims who suffer deeply and
permanently. We aimed at: (a) showing that participants will present themselves as
prescriptively and descriptively normative individuals; (b) showing that individuals use the
proposed reactions in order to positively distinguish themselves from others by stating: (b1)
their higher injunctive and descriptive normativity regarding various reactions towards
innocent and noninnocent victims when compared to most people, and (b2) their higher
consistency between these two types of norms also when compared to most people; (c)
replicating Alves and Correia’s (2009)results of assessments of most people’s normativity
with a new operationalization of victim innocence.
Based on Alves and Correia (2009), we expected that: (a) participants would indicate
that both the self and most people would approve of and typically engage in valuation, contact
and suffering acknowledgement towards both the innocent victim and the noninnocent victim;
(b) the effect of victim innocence would be especially strong in ratings of (not) blaming the
victim. Specifically, participants would indicate that both the self and most people would
approve of and typically blame a noninnocent victim and not blame an innocent victim; (c)
reflecting the Primus Inter Pares effect, participants would positively distinguish themselves
8from most people in two ways: (c.1) by indicating that they would both approve of and
typically engage in the normative reactions to a higher extent than most people, and (c.2) by
presenting themselves as more consistent than most people. Specifically, ratings of
descriptive norms (i.e., how typical) involving the self would not differ from ratings of their
injunctive norms (i.e., how approved of); on the contrary, ratings of most people’s descriptive
norms would be lower than ratings of their injunctive norms.
Method
Participants
Our convenience sample comprises 273 undergraduates of both sexes (136 males and
133 females, four unreported) studying in Lisbon (Universidade Lusófona and Faculdade de
Letras de Lisboa) and Setúbal (Instituto Politécnico de Setúbal) took part in this study. The
participants were taking various degrees, such as geography, marketing or human resources.
Their ages varied between 18 and 57 (M = 23.86, SD = 6.18). We had access to these
participants through acquaintances who taught them one subject.
Procedure
The 30-minute sessions occurred during class time. The teacher present in the classes
introduced the experimenter (the first author), explained his presence there and indicated that
participation was fully voluntary. Then the experimenter stressed the voluntary aspect of their
participation and indicated that he would perfectly understand if they refused to take part (no
one refused to take part in the study). Afterwards, the experimenter delivered a sheet of paper
with an overview of the study which was introduced as an impression formation and
behavioral judgment study. Participants read a text presented as the summary of a case taken
from a study about road accidents. The word “victim” was never used in the study and he/she
was referred to as X both in the text and in the measures. The text manipulated the victim
innocence by presenting him/her as either responsible (noninnocent) or not responsible
(innocent) for the onset of his/her situation. The text also described his/her suffering which
was always presented as very severe and permanent. Next, participants responded to the
dependent measures. Finally, they were probed for suspicion, thanked and debriefed.
Independent Variables
This experimental study consisted of a 2 (innocence of the victim: innocent/
noninnocent) X 2 (type of norm: injunctive/descriptive) X 2 (referent: the self/ most people)
mixed-subjects design, with the two former factors between-subjects and the latter factor
within-subjects. Suffering was a controlled variable: the victim suffered severely (e.g., 85% of
the body burnt, disfigurement, no eyelids, need of constant eye lubrication) and permanently
9(need of permanent medical care, with life expectation being equivalent to the population
average, according to doctors). The various versions of our instruments were randomly
distributed among participants.
The victim innocence was manipulated in the text. In the innocent condition
participants read that the victim had been driving carefully and at low speed (no more than 50
Km/h - about 30 miles an hour) and that oil on the road caused the victim to lose control of
the car and to fall from a cliff. In the noninnocent condition, the victim was described as
having driven drunk, recklessly and at high speed (between 150-170 Km/h – about 95-105
miles an hour) resulting in falling from a cliff after having swerved too much to his/her right.
The various speeds were presented as estimations by experts and blood alcohol levels were
said to be obtained through blood analyses. These operationalizations were pretested among
15 participants who read one of the two versions of the text (noninnocent or innocent victim)
and answered to two questions on 7-point Likert-type scales from 1 (not at all) to 7 ( very
much): “To what extent does X suffer?”; “To what extent is X responsible for his/her
situation?” The effect of the victim innocence on the perceived seriousness of suffering was
nonsignificant, M = 6.67, SD = 0.94, but pretesters clearly distinguished between the
responsibility of the innocent, M = 1.38, SD = 1.15, from that of the noninnocent victim, M =
6.43, SD = 0.85, t(13) = -18.58, p < .001.
The type of norm and the referent were manipulated through the instruction “Taking
into account X’s situation, indicate for each of the following sentences, the extent to which
you/ most people approve of [injunctive norm]; it is typical of you/ most people” [descriptive
norm]. Each participant responded to one type of norm from the point of view of two
referents (the self and most people). The order of the referents was counterbalanced across
participants.
Dependent measures
The participants were asked about both their and most people’s perceived approval
(injunctive normativity) or about their and most people’s perceived typicality (descriptive
normativity) regarding eight reactions. Each reaction was operationalized through one
sentence. The sentences which operationalized the reactions were the same as in Alves and
Correia (2009) and can be found in the Appendix. The Portuguese sentences were equivalent
in length for the various reactions (23-25 words long) and were pretested for their perceived
opposition and meanings (e.g., valuation vs. devaluation; see Alves & Correia, 2009). The
order of the sentences was randomly established with the criterion that one sentence could not
be immediately followed by its opposite. The sentences comprised four secondary
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victimization reactions (devaluation, avoidance, suffering minimization and blaming the
victim) and four non secondary victimization reactions (valuation, contact, suffering
acknowledgement and not blaming the victim). Participants rated the reactions on seven-point
Likert type scales: approval, from 1 (I/most other people do not approve of at all) to7 (I/most
other people approve of very much); typicality, from 1(not typical of me at all / most other
people) to 7 (very much typical of me/ most other people).
We calculated eight indices comprising the difference of the ratings for each “non
secondary victimization- secondary victimization” pair (e.g., “contact” minus “avoidance”)1.
These indices were our measure of perceived approval or typicality for each pair of opposing
reactions, according to the participants’ view and the one they attributed to most people. Since
the participants rated their judgments on 7-point scales (from 1 to 7), the resulting difference
could range between –6 (total agreement that a secondary victimization reaction is approved
of/typical) and +6 (total agreement that a non secondary victimization reaction is approved
of/typical). A rating equivalent to zero was interpreted as indicating that both the secondary
victimization and the non-secondary victimization reactions were equally approved of or
typical.
Results
We conducted a 2 (victim innocence) X 2 (type of norm) X 2 (referent) X 4 (reactions)
mixed-subjects ANOVA, with the two former factors between-subjects and the latter two
factors within-subjects. Due to the violation of the sphericity assumption we used the Huynh-
Feldt estimates to correct for degrees of freedom (ε = .93, for the interaction effect between
reactions and type of norm). There were several significant main effects, two-way and three-
way interactions2. Since the four-way interaction was significant, F(2.85, 766.38) = 3.44, p =
.02, ηp2 = .013, and it qualifies the previous effects, we will focus on it. One-tailed values are
presented. Mean and standard deviation values are reported on Table 1.
Please, insert table 1 about here
Hypothesis a predicted that participants would indicate that both they and most people
would approve of and typically engage in valuation, contact and suffering acknowledgement
towards the innocent and the noninnocent victim. As far as the participants themselves were
concerned, results were fully in line with our expectations. In fact, they indicated that they
themselves would approve of valuation, contact and suffering acknowledgment towards both
the innocent victim, Ms = 3.13, 3.26, 2.37, and the noninnocent victim, M = 2.69, 3.25, 2.44.
Also as expected, they indicated that they would typically engage in valuation, contact and
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suffering acknowledgment towards both the innocent victim Ms = 2.76, 2.76, 2.15, and the
noninnocent victim, Ms = 1.86, 2.16, 1.10.
As far as most people are concerned, our predictions received full support for their
approved of reactions but only partial support regarding their typical reactions. In fact,
participants indicated, as expected, that most people would approve of valuation, contact and
suffering towards both the innocent victim, Ms = 2.36, 1.90, 1.09, and the noninnocent victim,
Ms = 2.19, 1.75, 1.14. Also as expected, participants indicated that most people would
typically engage in valuation of the innocent victim, M = 0.87, and suffering
acknowledgement of both the innocent, Minnocent = 0.92, and the noninnocent victims
Mnoninnocent = 0.79. All these values were significantly different from zero, ts ≥ 2.89, ps ≤ .005,
but none reached its highest possible value, that is, +6 or –6, ts ≥ 9.25, ps < .001. Contrarily to
expected, however, participants indicated that most people would typically engage in a blend
of secondary victimization and non secondary victimization in some cases. Specifically, they
indicated that most people would engage in contact-avoidance of the innocent, Ms = .011, and
the noninnocent victim, M = 0.26, and in valuation-derogation of the noninnocent victim M =
0.40. The latter values were the only ones in this study to be statistically equivalent to zero, ts
≤ 1.30, ps ≥ .20.
Hypothesis b concerned the remaining pair of reactions, that is, (not) blaming the
victim for his/her suffering. Specifically regarding the innocent victim, it predicted that
participants would indicate that they themselves and most people would approve of and
typically not blame him/her. On the contrary, as concerns the noninnocent victim, it predicted
that both they and most people would approve of and typically blame him/her for his/her
suffering. Consistent with this hypothesis, participants indicated that both they and most
people would approve of not blaming the innocent victim, Mself = 3.24; Mmost people = 2.74, and
blaming the noninnocent victim for his/her suffering, Mself = -3.59; Mmost people = -2.09.
Similarly, participants also indicated that both they and most people would typically not
blame the innocent victim for his/her suffering, Mself = 2.44; Mmost people = 2.41, but would
blame the noninnocent victim, Mself = -2.24; Mmost people = -1.64.
According to Hypothesis c our results would reflect the Primus Inter Pares effect in
two ways. First, participants would indicate that they approved (injunctive norms) and would
typically engage (descriptive norms) in the reactions to a higher extent than most people
(Hypothesis c.1); second, they would indicate higher consistency between their injunctive and
descriptive norms than between those of most people (Hypothesis c.2).
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Regarding ratings of approved of reactions, Hypothesis c.1 was fully supported. In
fact, participants indicated that they would approve of the various normative reactions to a
higher extent than most people. This pattern was obtained towards the innocent victim
(comparisons of cells 1 vs. 2 of Table 1): more valuation, F(1, 269) = 8.04, p = .003, ηp2 =
0.03; more contact, F(1, 269) = 14.85, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.05; more suffering acknowledgement,
F(1, 269) = 19.27, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.07; and not blame, F(1, 269) = 2.91, p = 04, ηp2 = 0.01.
This pattern was also obtained for the noninnocent victim (comparisons of cells 3 vs. 4 of
Table 1). In other words, when compared to most people participants indicated that they
would approve of: more valuation, F(1, 269) = 2.81, p = .05, ηp2 = 0.01; more contact, F(1,
269) = 15.03, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.05; more suffering acknowledgement, F(1, 269) = 16.76, p <
.001, ηp2 = 0.06; and blame, F(1, 269) = 22.02, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.08.
Regarding ratings of engaged in reactions, Hypothesis c.1 was also supported for its
most part. In fact, participants indicated that that they would engage in the majority of the
normative reactions to a higher extent than most people. This pattern was obtained towards
the innocent victim (comparisons of cells 5 vs. 6 of Table 1): more valuation, F(1, 269) =
47.18, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.15; more contact, F(1, 269) = 55.09, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.17; and more
suffering acknowledgement, F(1, 269) = 17.59, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.06. Contrarily to expected,
however, as concerns not blaming this victim, participants did not make such a positive
distinction, F(1, 269) = .01, p = .46.
Regarding the noninnocent victim, Hypothesis c.1 was also supported for the most
part. In fact, participants indicated that they would engage in the majority of the normative
reactions to a higher extent than most people towards the noninnocent victim (comparisons of
cells 7 vs. 8 of Table 1). The expected pattern showing a positive distinction of the self was
present for: valuation, F(1, 269) = 21.86, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.08; contact, F(1, 269) = 21.77, p <
.001, ηp2 = 0.08; and blaming him/her, F(1, 269) = 3.23, p = .03, ηp2 = 0.01. Contrarily to
expected, however, we did not find such a distinction for suffering acknowledgement, F(1,
269) = 0.87, p = .18.
Finally, as far as Hypothesis c.2 is concerned, which predicted higher consistency
between the participants’ injunctive and descriptive norms than between those of most people,
it was partially supported. As concerns participants’ own norms towards the innocent victim
(cells 1 vs. 5 of Table 1), there were no significant differences between what they indicated to
approve of and to typically engage in the cases of valuation, contact, and suffering
acknowledgement, all Fs ≤ 1.49, ps ≥ .11. Regarding the noninnocent victim, however,
participants did not show such consistency (cells 3 vs. 7 of Table 1). In fact, they indicated to
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approve of more than to typically engage in valuation, F(1, 269) = 3.74, p = .027, ηp2 = 0.01;
contact, F(1, 269) = 5.70, p = .01, ηp2 = 0.02; and suffering acknowledgement, F(1, 269) =
8.66, p = .001, ηp2 = 0.03. This unexpected discrepancy was also present in the (not) blaming
the victim. In other words, participants indicated that they would approve of more than
actually not blame the innocent victim, F(1, 269) = 12.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .016, and blame the
noninnocent victim, F(1, 269) = 5.17, p = .005, ηp2 = 0.04.
As far as most people are concerned, valuation and contact showed the predicted
patterns, that is inconsistency between their injunctive and descriptive norms. Specifically,
regarding the innocent victim (cells 2 vs. 6 of Table 1) most people were rated as approving
of more than engaging in valuation, F(1, 269) = 12.01, p = .001, ηp2 = 0.04 , and contact, F(1,
269) = 17.33, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.06. This pattern was also found for the noninnocent victim:
valuation, F(1, 269) = 14.01, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.05; contact, F(1, 269) = 9.72, p = .001, ηp2 =
0.04. Contrary to our predictions, however, patterns regarding suffering acknowledgement
and (not) blaming the victim showed no significant differences regarding the innocent and the
noninnocent victim, all Fs ≤ 1.17, ps ≥ .07.
Given that the patterns obtained for (not) blaming the victims were completely
unsupported (i.e., consistency for most people and inconsistency for the self), we compared
the perception of the participants’ own descriptive norms with that of most people’s
injunctive norms. Duncan post-hoc tests showed that the differences were nonsignificant, ps =
.50 and .71, which indicates that what participants say they themselves do is equivalent to
what they say that most people approve of.
Discussion
With this study we intended to investigate perceptions of injunctive and descriptive
norms of reactions towards innocent and noninnocent victims who suffer deeply and
permanently. Specifically, our main goals were to show that individuals perceive that social
norms governing most people’s reactions (Alves & Correia, 2009) also apply to individuals
themselves. Furthermore, we also aimed to show that individuals engage in self-others
distinction by stating their superior conformity to and their higher consistency between their
injunctive and descriptive norms when they refer to reactions towards a serious victimization
case. As expected, most ratings were in the non secondary victimization direction, except for
the case of blaming the noninnocent victim, which replicates Alves and Correia (2009). More
importantly, our study not only extends these findings to self ratings but it also shows that
individuals indicate that these norms apply more to them than to most people.
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Our results indicate that participants distinguished themselves normatively from most
people (Codol, 1975) in various ways. First, they indicate that, compared to most people, they
would approve of valuation and contact with both the innocent and the noninnocent victim,
and suffering acknowledgement of an innocent victim to a higher extent than most people
(i.e., presenting themselves as more injunctively normative, Cialdini et al., 1991). Second,
participants indicate that they would typically engage in these reactions to a higher extent than
most people (i.e., presenting themselves as more descriptively normative, Cialdini et al.,
1991). This positive distinction of the self is even more clear regarding descriptive than
injunctive normativity. In fact, as far as injunctive norms are concerned, participants
acknowledge that most people are clearly normative, albeit to a lesser extent than them, which
is a typical Primus Inter Pares effect pattern (Codol, 1975). As regards descriptive
normativity participants indicate, however, that most people engage in a blend of contact with
and avoidance of both the innocent and the noninnocent victims, and a blend of valuation and
devaluation of the noninnocent victim. Victims who suffer deeply and permanently,
especially if they are innocent, tend to be secondarily victimized when help or support is not
possible or it is too costly (Correia et al., 2001). Thus, the pattern obtained concerning most
people’s typical reactions is somewhat ironically closer to reality than that concerning the
self. Third, individuals distinguish themselves normatively from most people by presenting
themselves as more consistent than most people regarding approved and typical contact and
valuation towards the innocent victim. This pattern, however, is not present in the case of the
noninnocent victim. In fact, individuals indicate that both they and most people would engage
in valuation and contact with the victim to a lesser extent than they approved of these
reactions. Thus, it seems that it is more important to show consistency towards an innocent
victim than towards a noninnocent victim, at least as far as contact and valuation are
concerned. This pattern seems to reflect the fact that innocent victims are normatively more
valued than noninnocent ones (Lerner, 2003).
We would like to stress that in the case of suffering acknowledgement, however,
participants did not distinguish themselves from most people through higher consistency. In
fact, in the case of the innocent victim, participants indicated that they and most people would
descriptively follow the injunctive norm. Surprisingly, in the case of the noninnocent victim
they indicated that their actual suffering acknowledgement would not be as strong as the
extent to which they approved of it. This pattern again suggests that innocent victims are
normatively more important than noninnocent ones. Nevertheless, participants indicated that
most people would show consistency between their injunctive and descriptive norms
15
regarding suffering acknowledgement. Although it seems that participants are stating that
most people are more normative (i.e., consistent) than them, a glance at the mean values
shows that according to participants it is “easier” for most people to be consistent in this case.
In fact, mean values of injunctive normativity for most people are already relatively low, in
fact as low as participants’ ratings of their own descriptive normativity.
As expected, the victim innocence has the strongest effect on ratings of (not) blaming
the victim, as was the case in Alves and Correia (2009). On the one hand, ratings of blaming
the noninnocent victim for his/her situation are the only ones to be clearly of the secondary
victimization type both for injunctive and descriptive normativity ratings. On the other hand,
ratings involving the innocent victim are clearly of the non secondary victimization type (i.e.,
not blaming) also for both kinds of norms. As expected, individuals indicate that they approve
of blaming the noninnocent victim and not blaming the innocent victim to a higher extent than
most people. Also as expected, they also indicate that they would actually blame the
noninnocent victim to a higher extent than most people. Unexpectedly, however, no
difference was obtained regarding not blaming the innocent victim. The latter result seems to
indicate that it is more important to find responsibility than innocence in others. Another
unexpected pattern worth mentioning is that in this case participants indicated less
consistency between their injunctive and descriptive norms than between most people’s for
both the innocent and the noninnocent victims. Yet, it seems that individuals opted to
distinguish themselves from most people with another strategy because their descriptive
norms are as strong as most people’s injunctive norms. Thus, participants indicate that what
they actually do is equivalent to what most people approve of, which contrasts with what they
indicate regarding valuation and contact.
Possibly the different patterns of self-others distinction between suffering
acknowledgement and (not) blaming the victim on the one hand, and valuation and contact on
the other hand, may be explained by the fact that regarding the latter reactions participants
perceive themselves, but not most people, as relatively immune to perverse norms. Perverse
norms exist in situations in which individuals are expected to follow injunctive norms
although they are impossible or very difficult to be followed due to the characteristics of the
situations themselves (Fernández-Dols, 1992; Oceja & Fernández-Dols, 2001). Although the
theorizing of perverse norms has focused on formal norms, such as laws, it seems a fruitful
approach to extend it to informal norms. In our case, it is likely that emotions are the
mechanism that makes the fulfillment of approved contact and valuation difficult.
Specifically, the perceived decrease in most people’s descriptive normativity may be
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explained by the higher emotional involvement required than in the case of the remaining
reactions (the victim was disabled and disfigured). If our reasoning is true, it seems that
participants actually believe that they, but not most people, can overcome the emotional
distress resulting from being with such a victim. They may also actually believe that they
would typically engage in contact with such a victim to the same extent as they approve of
these reactions. We put forward this is an illusion because it is not possible for most
individuals to be more consistent than most other individuals. We also think that this may be a
perverse mechanism because if individuals are illusioned about their ability to overcome
emotional stress, they are not aware of their most probable reactions which the literature has
shown to be secondary victimization (e.g., Correia et al., 2001; Hafer & Bègue, 2005). This
unawareness may contribute to the perpetuation of these automatic reactions because
individuals will not try to correct them. This, however, is a post-hoc explanation which was
not tested in the current study. Future studies should ask participants’ perceptions of their and
most others’ emotional reactions and test whether they mediate perceptions of injunctive and
descriptive normativity.
We would like to stress that none of the reactions was rated at its highest or lowest
possible point. Next, we present some explanations for this pattern which also hint at
limitations to our study. A possible reason may be connected to the operationalizations of
reactions which seem “extreme” at least at face value. This may have caused participants to
refrain from more fully agreeing or disagreeing with them. Another reason for this pattern
may be that participants rated opposing reactions, the operationalizations of which were
somewhat symmetrical. This fact may have unwittingly reminded participants that there are
two sides to the matter and, as a consequence, they may have moderated their ratings. Finally,
there could be several norms exerting their influence simultaneously. In the case of blaming
the victim, participants may have indicated that they do not completely approve of nor would
completely engage in it because a norm of compassion for those who suffer deeply moderated
the impact of the norm of responsibility. These limitations could be addressed in future
studies by the use of less “extreme” and asymmetrical operationalizations of reactions, and by
normatively focusing participants (Cialdini et al., 1991) on either a norm of compassion or a
norm of responsibility before they rate reactions. Also, it could be fruitful to turn this research
to an intergroup level of analysis. In fact, although we have stressed the interpersonal level of
analysis because neither the victim nor most other people were categorized, our explanation
for the normative distinction between self-most others is consistent with other theoretical
interpretations (Social Identity Theory -Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Social Categorization Theory
17
–e.g., Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). Given that these theories address intergroup
relations, it would be very interesting to manipulate the social category of “others” as in-
group or out-group members in order to test the hypothesis that in-group members will be
judged to adhere more strongly to norms towards victims than outgroup members.
Despite the above mentioned limitations we believe that our study has indicated new
research directions in this domain. Individuals engage in positive self-other distinction, as our
results show, by indicating that they themselves adopt those norms to an even higher extent
than most other people. Given the strong influence of norms on behaviors (Nolan et al., 2008)
and that injunctive norms protect victims (Alves & Correia, 2009), it is imperative that
individuals are made aware of the discrepancy between what they think they themselves
would typically do (i.e., non secondary victimization) and what individuals actually do (i.e.,
secondary victimization) even when they were supposed to engage in non secondary
victimization (van den Bos & Maas, 2009). Our work may be used to guide campaigns aiming
to inform individuals about this counterintuitive discrepancy which they are most probably
unaware of. As in other domains, these campaigns may not prevent automatic reactions from
happening. Without such campaigns, however, individuals are likely to remain in their
normative delusion that victims can count more on them than on most people. As a result,
they do not exert the required effort to “correct” their automatic reactions, thus failing to
provide these people with the just and humane treatment that they are entitled to. Moreover,
our results may guide campaigns about victimization which involve abuse/violence (such as
domestic abuse). By stressing that society at large does not accept victimization, campaigns
could encourage bystanders to act (e.g., by complaining to authorities) instead of remaining
silent.
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Footnotes
1 In order to avoid awkward expressions, such as “contact-avoidance”, from now onwards we
will only refer to the reaction reflected in the mean values. As we will see next, because most
values go in the direction of non secondary victimization, we will refer to these indices mostly
as “valuation”, “contact” and “suffering acknowledgement”, and will use the verbs “value”,
“contact” and “acknowledge”, respectively. Nevertheless, because results indicate that the
noninnocent victim should be and is blamed and the innocent victim should be and is not
blamed, we will have to use the expressions blam(e)ing/not blam(e)ing. To note that given our
operationalization of the latter dependent variables, a more precise label would have been
hold(ing)/not hold(ing) the victim responsible (see Shaver & Drown, 1986). Again for the
sake of simplicity we opted for blam(e)ing/not blam(e)ing.
2
. Due to space constraints and to avoid a mere description of various effects that would
distract the reader from the main message, we do not include these effects here. The interested
reader may contact the first author for details.
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Table 1.
Means (and standard deviations) for each pair of reactions according to the kinds of norms,
the victim innocence and the referent
Injunctive norm Descriptive norm
Innocent
victim
Noninnocent victim Innocent
victim
Noninnocent victim
Self
(1)
People
(2)
Self
(3)
People
(4)
Self
(5)
People
(6)
Self
(7)
People
(8)
Valuation-
devaluation
3.13
(2.28)
2.36
(2.46)
2.69
(2.50)
2.19
(2.81)
2.76
(2.16)
0.87
(2.54)
1.86
(2.53)
0.40
(2.78)
Contact-
avoidance
3.26
(2.26)
1.90
(2.48)
3.25
(2.60)
1.75
(2.73)
2.76
(2.54)
0.11
(2.70)
2.16
(2.77)
0.26
(2.70)
Recog.-minim.
of suffering
2.37
(2.40)
1.09
(2.38)
2.44
(2.73)
1.14
(2.71)
2.15
(2.43)
0.92
(2.10)
1.10
(2.48)
0.79
(2.07)
Not blaming-
blaming
3.24
(2.02)
2.74
(2.17)
-3.59
(2.12)
-2.09
(2.72)
2.44
(2.06)
2.41
(2.11)
-2.24
(2.45)
-1.64
(2.32)
Note. Scores could vary between – 6 (complete agreement with devaluation, avoidance,  suffering minimization
and blaming) and + 6 (complete agreement with valuation, contact, suffering acknowledgement and not
blaming).
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Appendix
Devaluation: “In my opinion he/she is just a burden to other folks and worthless for anything.”
Valuation: “In my opinion he/she’s someone who is still here to give other folks joy and who has
worth for everything.”
Avoidance: “I prefer not to meet him/her or to know how his/her situation is evolving. I think that in
these cases distance is the best.”
Contact: “I want to be with him/her whenever it is possible and to know how his/her condition is
evolving. The best in these cases is to be nearby.”
Suffering minimization: “At least he/she’s got her/his parents’ support and money for medical care,
and that decreases most suffering that he/she might feel.”
Suffering acknowledgement: “He/she’s got her/his parents’ support and money for medical care, but
nothing will decrease the suffering that s/he feels”.
Blaming: “If he/she’s in that situation it’s all due to her/him. It’s all his/her responsibility. S/he should
not have driven the car.”
Not blaming: “If he/she’s in that situation that’s because he/she had bad luck. There are so many
people driving and this had to happen exactly to him/her”.
